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IT is probably fair to say that, because of the way they have been studied, neither Indian Buddhist monasticism nor the Buddhist monastery in India have been allowed to have anything like a real history. Whether implicitly or 
explicitly, conscious or not, most modem scholars have either unquestion­
ingly assumed, or worked hard to show, that extant monastic or vinaya 
sources, for example, must be early, some even asserting—or again assum­
ing—that they must go back to the Buddha himself. But the necessary con­
sequences of this have rarely been examined: if the extant vinaya sources are 
early, if they go back anywhere near the time of the Buddha, then Buddhist 
monasticism could not have any real institutional history—it could only 
have sprung all but fully formed from the head of the Buddha. Moreover, 
since these extant vinaya sources already know and are meant to govern 
fully developed, well-organized, walled monasteries that had infirmaries, 
refectories, bathrooms, steam rooms, locks and keys, the Buddhist mona­
stery too could have had no real development, and consequently no actual 
history. It would have been architecturally finished from its very start.
Such pictures—one is tempted to say fantasies—fit, of course, not at all 
well with what is known about monasticisms elsewhere. More importantly, 
and in specific regard to the Indian Buddhist monastery for which we have 
some independent, non-literary sources as well, it does not fit at all with 
what is found in the archaeological record of Buddhist monastic sites in 
India. The earliest Buddhist “monasteries0  that are known in India—and 
none of these are pre-A&okan—are not “monasteries0  at all. They are either
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only barely improved, unorganized, natural caverns or caves, or poorly con­
structed and ill-organized shelters built of rubble or other cheap materials.1 
Communities living in these environments could not have produced our 
elaborate vinayas, nor would they have had any use for them. Since such 
communities had no steam rooms (jentdka), for example, how could 
they possibly have generated elaborate rules governing their construction 
and use?
Clearly there is something curiously wrong here, and the early history of 
Buddhist monasticism and Buddhist monasteries in India must be funda­
mentally rethought and reexamined. But there are other equally interesting 
projects that also must be undertaken. Once it is allowed that, yes, both 
Buddhist monasticism and Buddhist monasteries had histories, that both 
developed and changed over time, then “early” Buddhist monasticisms— 
and we should probably begin to use the plural seriously here—and the 
“early” Buddhist monastery, become only one, and certainly not the only 
important, object of investigation. We need no longer be implicitly or 
explicitly concerned primarily with the question of what Buddhist monasti­
cisms originally were. We might be equally—and probably more fruitful­
ly—concerned with what at given places at given points in time they had 
become. We might begin to meaningfully talk about “early” and “early 
medieval” and “medieval” and “late” Buddhist monasticisms, and study 
each of these in their own right and not, for example, as mere exemplifica­
tions of the decline and degeneration of some “early” and largely assumed 
single “ideal.” Each of these monasticisms will need to be understood and 
evaluated on their own terms, and this, of course, will not be easy.
If, for example, we want to know what Buddhist monasticism had become 
in North India in the period between the mature Kusan and the 5th/6th cen­
turies—the period that for lack of a better term might be called “the early 
medieval”, and the period which is generally taken to be that of “the 
Mahayana”—then the Mulasarvastivada-vinaya becomes a primary source. 
There is an almost general agreement that this vinaya is “late” and was 
redacted and used during this period. There is the same sort of agreement 
that during this period this vinaya had clear connections with North India,
1 For some brief remarks on the “early” archaeological and inscriptiona! evidence for 
viharas, see Gregory Schopen, “Doing Business for the Lord: Lending on Interest and 
Written Loan Contracts in the M ulasarvastivada-vinayaf Journal o f  the American Oriental 
Society 114 (1994): 527-54; esp. 547-52.
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with Gandhara, Mathura, and perhaps Kashmir.2 This is the good part. The 
bad part follows almost immediately: the Mulasarvastivada-vinaya is enor­
mous. Sylvain L£vi has described it as “une vaste compilation,” as “presque 
6pique,” as an “immense pot-pourri de la discipline bouddhique,” as “mon- 
stnieux” and “en soi un canon deja complet.” Huber, too, refers to it as “cette 
Snorme compilation,” and Lalou as “cet dnorme vinaya”—here too there is 
general agreement and it is not difficult to see why.3 The Tibetan version of 
the Mulasarvastivada-vinaya in, for example, the Derge edition is almost 
four thousand folios long and takes up thirteen volumes, and even it may not 
be complete. It seems to lack two texts often quoted by Gunaprabha entitled 
the Matrkd and the Nidana, although both may now be represented in the 
Tibetan traditions by what is there called the Uttaragrantha(s).4 Large por­
tions of its Vinayavastu have also been preserved in Sanskrit in the manu­
scripts from Gilgit,5 and significant portions of its Vibhahga are also 
available—usually in truncated or crudely condensed form—in the 
Divyavadana.6 There is as well a Chinese translation, although it is incom-
2 See the discussion and sources cited in Gregory Schopen, “The Bones o f  a Buddha and 
the Business o f  a Monk: Conservative Monastic Values in an Early Mahayana Polemical 
Tract?'Journal o f  Indian Philosophy 27 (1999): 279-324; esp. 292ff. That in fact a ll “les 
Vinayas parvenus A nous ont et£ redig£s a une 6poque tardive” was suggested already long 
ago by W assilieff (W. W assilieff, “Le bouddhisme dans son plein developpement d ’apres les 
v i n a y a s , de I ’histoire des religions 34 [1896]: 318-25), and this suggestion came as 
well to be seconded by Sylvain L6vi (“Les Elements de formation du divyavadana,” T ’oung 
/too 8 (1907): 116-17).
3  Sylvain L6vi, “Les saintes ecritures du bouddhisme. Comment s ’est constitue le canon 
sacr6," in Memorial Sylvain Levi (Paris: 1937): 78, 80 ,84; Ed. Huber, “Etudes bouddhiques 
III— La roi Kaniska dans le vinaya des mulasarvastivadins,” Bulletin de Cecole fran$aise 
d ’extreme-orient 14 (1914): 18; Marcelle Lalou, “Notes sur la decoration des monastires 
bouddhiques," Revue des arts asiatiques 5.3 ( 1930): 183. (According to a notice published by 
Louis de la Vallfee Poussin in 1929, Lalou “. . .  travaille a 1‘Analyse e t Bibliographie du 
Vinaya des Mulasarvastivadins, vaste compilation pleine de documents indispensables.” 
Academie royale de belgique. Bulletin de la classe des lettres e t des sciences morales et poli- 
tiques 5 s6rie-T.15 [1929]: 366).
4  Gregory Schopen, “Marking Time in Buddhist Monasteries: On Calendars, Clocks, and 
Some Liturgical Practices," in Suryacandraya. Essays in Honour o f  Akira Yuyama on the 
Occasion o f  his 65th Birthday (Indica et Tibetica 35), ed. P. Harrison and G. Schopen 
(Swisttal-Odendorf: 1998): 157-79; esp. 171-72 and ns. 51-54.
5 Klaus Wille, D ie hands chrift liehe Ober lie f  erung des Vinayavastu der Mulasarvastivddin 
(Verzeichnis der oriental ischen Handschriften in Deutschland, Suppl,-Bd. 30. Stuttgart: 
1990).
6  See most recently Satoshi Hiraoka, “The Relation between the Divyavadana and the
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plete, “full of gaps,” and “much less exact than the Tibetan one”; Lamotte, 
in fact, characterizes it as “mediocre.”* 7
Mulasarvastivadavinaya,” Journal o f  Indian Philosophy 26 (1998): 419-34 and the sources
cited.
7 Erich Frauwallner, The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings o f  Buddhist Literature (Serie 
Orientate Roma 8. Rome: 1956): 194-95; Etienne Lamotte, Histoire du bouddhisme indien. 
Des origines a I ‘ere saka (Louvain: 1958): 187.
8 B. Jinananda, Upasampadajhaptih (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series VI. Patna: 1961): 
15.5; Helmut Eimer, Rab Tu 'Byun Ba ‘i Gli. Die tibetische Ubersetzung des Pravrajyavastu 
im F/naj'u derAfu/asarvaynvaJizis (Asia tische Forschungen 82. Wiesbaden: 1983): ii 142.13. 
The Tibetan version of this entire vastu is in part translated and in part closely—if not always 
correctly—paraphrased in Anukul Chandra Banerjee, Sarvastivada Literature (Calcutta: 
1957): 100-186; see esp. 120.
The bulk of the Mulasarvastivada-vinaya is, however, only a part of the 
bad news. This Vinaya is not only huge, it has also been little studied, and 
only a tiny portion of it has been critically edited in any language. This 
means—at the very least—that anything said about it at this stage can be 
only tentative and provisional.
These are all serious problems, but an equally serious obstacle to any 
understanding of this “monster” is the fact that much of what it seems to 
contain does not correspond to what we thought we knew about the charac­
ter and defining characteristics of monastic Buddhism. It has, for example, 
been commonly assumed or asserted that becoming a Buddhist monk 
involved—or even required—renouncing all personal property. But the 
Mulasarvastivada-vinaya seems to assume, or even require, something quite 
different. According, for example, to the Mulasarvastivadin ordination for­
mulary which has come down to us in a Sanskrit manuscript from Tibet, the 
candidate for ordination must be asked: “Do you have any debt (deya, bu 
Ion), either large or small, to anyone?” If he says yes, then he must be asked: 
“Will you be able to repay this after you have entered the order {saksyasi 
pravrajydyam datum)?” If he says no, the text says he must be sent away and 
he cannot be admitted into the order. Only if he says that he will be able to 
pay can the ordination proceed.8 Here, in other words, the expectation— 
indeed the rule—is that a successful candidate for Mulasarvastivadin ordi­
nation would not renounce private wealth, but in fact retain it, and be 
responsible for and able to pay any debt that was contracted prior to ordina­
tion.
These sorts of expectations are moreover found elsewhere in this Vinaya 
in a startling variety of contexts. The Vinayavibhanga, for example, repeat-
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edly assumes that monks will be subject to tolls and road taxes and gives 
rules that require monks to pay them (Derge Ca 72b.6ff). This must mean 
that the redactors of this Vinaya also assumed two other things: that monks 
while traveling would be transporting taxable goods, and that monks would 
have the means to pay the taxes. That it was assumed that these were their 
own personal goods and that the payments were made from their own 
resources, is made virtually certain by the fact that the Vibhanga has a sepa­
rate set of rules dealing with the payment of tolls on goods that are for ritu­
al purposes and are corporately owned; i.e., that belong to the Buddha or the 
Dharma or the Sangha. In this case it is explicitly stated that the tolls must be 
paid from corporate funds (Derge Ca 76b.4-78a.4). In the Ksudrakavastu 
there is a rule explicitly stating that when a monk borrows (bmyas pa) a mat 
from another monk and that mat is damaged by him, the borrowing monk 
must compensate the owner: “He must either give him the price of its full 
value or what will satisfy him.’5 (ri ba 7 rin sbyin par bya ba ’am /d e  7 sems 
mgu bar bya’o—Derge Tha 49a. 1). In the same Vastu monks are explicitly 
told that when their property is stolen, they must not take the thieves to court 
but buy back from them what they stole, even if they have to give the full 
price (rgyal po ’i pho brang du sbron par mi bya 'i ’on kyang sngar chos 
bshad nas bslang bar bya ’o /  gal te mi ster na rin phyed kyis blang bar 
bya ’o /g a l te de Itar yang mi ster na rin tshang bar byin la blang bar bya 
ste—Derge Tha 233b.2). And the Ksudrakavastu also explicitly declares 
that monks must carry seals (rgya bcang bar bya ’o). Such seals were meant 
to mark property and the text, again, explicitly says there are two sorts of 
seals, seals of the community, and seals of individuals (rgya ni gnyis te /dge 
’dun gyi dang gang zag gi o—Derge Tha 7b.6-8a.7. Cf. Vinayavibhafiga, 
Derge Ca 79b). This distinction here is particularly interesting as one of 
numerous instances where this Vinaya formally acknowledges the existence 
of individual private property (paudgalika) and distinguishes it from corpo­
rate or communal property (samghika). Yet another example occurs in the 
Civaravastu. Here the problem is that terminally ill monks were dying on 
bedding belonging to the community (gldnah asamvidita eva samghike 
sayandsane kdlam kurvanti). As a consequence the Buddha himself is made 
to order the attending monk to watch closely for the signs of imminent death 
and, when they occurred, to move the dying monk on some pretext onto 
his personal bedding (sarlravastham jnatva paudgalike sayandsane 
vydjenavatarya sayitavya iti—GMs iii 2, 123.16). And this same distinction 
also comes into play elsewhere in the Civaravastu in regard to dying monks.
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In one passage, for example, it is clearly assumed that monks normally 
owned or were expected to pay for any medicines they required or for any 
rituals that were performed on their behalf. This seems at least to follow 
from the fact that only in the case of very poor monks (alpajnata) could 
these be paid for out o f corporate funds (sdmghika\ and even then those cor­
porate funds were to be repaid if at all possible (GMs iii 2 124.11-125.9; cf. 
128.1-131.15). In fact the acknowledgement ofpaudgalika, of a monk’s pri­
vate property, also occurs in the Mulasarvastivadin Pratimoksa?
The mere existence o f the distinction between sdmghika and paudgalika, 
and the formal acknowledgement o f the latter in Mulasarvastivadin mo­
nastic law, should in themselves put to rest any doubts about whether 
Mulasarvastivadin monks were expected to have personal property. But to 
well and truly bury them we probably need only glance again at the last part 
o f the Civaravastu. There are there more than thirty-five pages detailing 
what can only be called Mulasarvastivadin monastic inheritance law. There 
are rules detailing what should happen to the property o f a monk from one 
“residence” (avasa) who dies in another (GMs iii 2, 113.14-117.4); rules 
dealing with the disposition o f the estate of a monk some o f whose property 
was held in trust (prativastu) by other monks or even laymen (GMs iii 2, 
143.15-145.13); rules laying down the formal procedures (karman) required 
when the community takes formal possession (adhitisthati) o f a deceased 
monk’s estate in order to distribute it (GMs iii 2,117.8-121.5 and 145.2-9); 
rules establishing the proper times for distributing a dead monk’s estate 
and for determining who can participate in that distribution (GMs iii 2, 
120.3-.20); etc. Rules dealing with monastic estates are, moreover, not 
found only in the Civaravastu. There are, for example, rules in the 
Ksudrakavastu stipulating that property that a monk “designates” (bsngo ba) 
for another monk while he is alive reverts to his estate upon his death (Derge 
Tha 254a. 1-.6), and, conversely, that property that was “designated by one 
monk for another does not belong to the latter’s estate when he dies, but con­
tinues to belong to the former” (Derge Tha 254a.6-254b.2). There is as well 
a large number of rules governing monastic estates and inheritance law in 
the Uttaragrantha(s), rules—for example—governing what must happen
9 Anukul Chandra Banerjee, Two Buddhist Vinaya Texts in Sanskrit (Calcutta: 1977): 
32.17: yah punar bhiksuh purvam samanujho bhutva tatah pascad evam vaded [yathd] 
samstutikayayusmantah samghikam labham parinatam  atmanah paudgalikam  
parinamayantiti payantikd /.
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when a monk borrows money from a laymen (dge slong gzhan zhig gis 
khyim bdag cig las kdr sha pa na zhig bskyes p a . ..) but dies without repay­
ing the loan (Derge Pa 132b.7-133a.3; see also Derge Pa 85a.3-86a.2; 
86a.2-.6; 86a.6-b.4; 86b.4-.7; 86b.7-87a.4; etc.).10 The size, finally, of 
some of the monastic estates that are mentioned is also impressive, and it 
seems clear that the redactors of this Vinaya assumed that some monastic 
estates would be very large indeed. One such estate is described as worth 
or consisting of “a great deal of gold, three hundred thousand of gold" 
(prabhutam suvarnam tisrah suvarnalaksah-GMs iii 2, 118.11), and this 
elicits no comment in the text and appears to pass as completely acceptable. 
In fact the Clvaravastu even has a set of rules specifically framed to deal 
with large estates left by monks who were “rich and famous" 
(jnatamahapunya-GMs iii 2, 123.10-15), and here again there is not the 
slightest indication that such estates were considered irregular or undesir­
able.
At least two things, it seems, are then already reasonably clear from 
the material quickly summarized to this point. A great deal of the 
Mulasarvastivada-vinaya takes for granted that the monks it was meant to 
govern had and were expected—even required—to have personal property 
and private wealth. If Buddhist monks were ever required to renounce pri­
vate property—and there are good reasons for doubting this—they certainly 
were not by the time the Mulasarvastivada-vinaya was redacted. Some 
Mulasarvastivadin monks, those who were “well known and of great merit," 
were in fact expected to be quite wealthy. Rather than suggest that such 
wealth should be renounced or avoided, this Vinaya redacted detailed rules 
to transmit that wealth to other monks and to shelter it from the state. The 
estates of men who died aputra, “sonless”—and monks at least normally 
did—otherwise went to the king, and this issue of law is twice directly 
addressed in the Clvaravastu (GMs iii 2, 118.1 Iff; 140.14ff).
In fact this preoccupation with specifically legal issues is the second 
seemingly characteristic feature of Mulasarvastivadin monasticism to 
emerge. The redactors of this Vinaya appear to have been just as much jurists
10 Almost all the provisions o f  Mulasarvastivadin monastic inheritance law have been col­
lected together and digested by Gunaprabha at Vinayasutra (Sankrityayana ed.) 85.3-86.5  
( - 'd u l b a ’i  mdo, Derge bstan ‘gyur ‘dul ba Wu 68a.2-69a.5. For the commentaries, see 
Svavyakhyarta Zu 126b.l-132b.7; Tikd Yu 178a.6-185a.3; Vydkhyana Ru 197b.7-200b.3; 
Vrtti Lu 250b.5-254a.4) and Bu-ston in his ‘dul ba p h a ’i gleng bum chen mo (Collected 
Works, Lokesh Chandra ed. Part 23) ‘A 29Oa.2-295a.3.
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as they were monks. They appear to apply to the questions of ownership and 
inheritance, for example, the same sort of care and precision that their col­
leagues working on the Abhidharma applied to the classification and defi­
nition of dharmas. In fact how much the “style” of thinking that dominates 
the Abhidharma owes to these monastic jurists is an open and emerging 
question.11 It may be that many of the techniques and styles of exposition 
were first employed in constructing the vinayas. The two bodies of material 
at the very least have many methods in common, and Vasubandhu, for 
example, deals not infrequently with what are in fact issues of monastic law. 
One of the best examples, perhaps, is his treatment of the rights and status of 
a monk who violates one of the parajika rules but who had no intention of 
concealing it (Shastri, ii 646)—the same topic is treated as well in the 
Ksudrakavastu (Derge Tha 102a.5-104b.2). But even putting these consid­
erations aside, what we have seen so far would seem to suggest that in regard 
to legal questions the Mulasarvastivada-vinaya has a degree of sophistica­
tion that is certainly notable, and it appears that the redactors of this Vinaya 
were certainly concerned with legal precision. But this same legal sophisti­
cation and concern is also found elsewhere in the Mulasarvastivada-vinaya.
11 Cf. Oskar von Hinuber, “Vinaya und Abhidhamma,” Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik 
19(1994): 109-22.
12 The Ksudraka text is discussed in some detail in Schopen, “Monastic Law Meets the 
Real World: A Monk’s Continuing Right to Inherit Family Property in Classical India,” 
H istory o f  Religions 35 (1995): 101-23. When this was written I was not aware o f  the text in 
the Uttaragrantha(s).
The redactors of the Mulasarvastivada-vinaya either adapted or invented 
a significant number of sophisticated financial instruments and economic 
devices. They knew and made rules governing the use of both oral and 
written wills, written loan contracts, permanent endowments, monetary 
deposits, interest-bearing loans, negotiable securities, and even what might 
be called a form of health insurance. The Civaravastu, for example, disal­
lows the use of nuncupative or oral wills by monks to dispose of their prop­
erty in favor of other monks (GMs iii 2, 124. 1-10). But this rule is also 
amended and clarified in both the Ksudrakavastu and the Uttaragrantha(s) 
where it is explicitly established that Buddhist monastic law does not apply 
to laymen and that, therefore, a nuncupative will made by a layman in favor 
of monks is both allowable and valid (Derge 252b.3-254a. 1; and Pa 
130a.4-13 la.3).12 The oral disposition of property prior to death was, of 
course, a subject of discussion in dharma-sastric law as well. More striking
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still is the sanctioned use of a written will (patrdbhilekhya, patrabhilikhita) 
by a layman of sorts to leave all of a considerable fortune to the community 
(GMs iii 2, 140.14ff). This is most certainly the earliest reference to a writ­
ten will in all of Indian literature and—apart from a possible second ref­
erence in the Divydvadana’s account of the death of A&oka—virtually 
unique.13 Not quite so unique are the detailed rules in both the Vibhahga 
and the Uttaragrantha(s) requiring monks to accept permanent endowments 
of cash (aksayanivi) and to lend that cash out on interest (Derge Ca 
154b.3-155b.2 and Pa 265a.6-265b.2). Both the rate of interest and the 
instructions to be followed in writing up the loan contract here are very close 
to what is found in dharma-sdstric sources, especially in Yajnavalkya.14 
And while in the Vibhahga, but not in the Uttaragrantha(s), it is the monks 
themselves who are to lend out the money, draw up the contract, and service 
the loan, the Ksudrakavastu contains a passage describing an arrangement, 
sanctioned by the Buddha, whereby a monetary deposit for the benefit of 
the monks is made by a lay person with a merchant, who in turn uses it as 
venture capital, the profit from which—how much is not specified—is to be 
distributed to the monks (Derge Tha 258a.3-259a.3). There is good inscrip- 
tional evidence for just such arrangements, especially from the Western 
Caves.15
13 The Civaravastu text is translated— without notes— in Schopen, “ Deaths, Funerals, and 
the Division o f Property in a Monastic Code,”  in Buddhism in Practice, ed. Donald S. Lopez 
Jr. (Princeton: 1995): 498-500. For the possible reference to a written w ill in the 
Divydvadana see Schopen, “ I f  You Can’t  Remember, How To Make It Up: Some Monastic 
Rules For Redacting Canonical Texts,”  in Bauddhavidyasudhakarah. Studies in Honour o f  
Heinz Bechert on the Occasion o f  his 65th Birthday (Indica et Tibetica 30. Swisttal-Odendorf: 
1997): 580 n.27.
14 On the Vibhahga text, see Schopen, “ Doing Business for the Lord,”  527ff. Here again 
when this was written I did not know o f the Uttaragrantha(s) text.
15 See, for example, Emile Senart, “ The Inscriptions in the Caves at Nasik,”  Epigraphia 
Indica 8 (1905-06): 59-96; esp. nos. 12, 15. But see also no. 17 where an endowment o f 100 
kdrsdpanas is given samghasa hathe.
There are also references in our PZnaya to both monks and nuns making 
use of what might be called negotiable securities or promissory notes 
(patralekhya, chags rgya). In fact our Vi nay a distinguishes between two 
sorts of such notes and gives separate rules for dealing with each. The Civar- 
avastu rules that when promissory notes come to the community as a part of 
an estate, whatever is realized from those that can be quickly liquidated 
(yacchighram sakyate sadhayitum) must be distributed among the monks,
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while those that cannot be so liquidated must be deposited in the strong­
room as property in common for the Community of the Four Directions 
(GMs iii 2,143.7-9). In the Bhiksunl-vibhanga the nun Sthulananda all but 
forces a layman to give her a promissory note (chags rgya), which he is 
holding, as a “gift” for reciting the Dharma for him. Neither the practice nor 
the note is presented as problematic. The problem arises only when 
Sthulananda tries to collect on it. She goes to the debtor and demands quick 
payment. The debtor, apparently a little surprised, asks “do you, Noble One, 
own this? (i.e., the note— 'phags ma khyod mnga ’ ‘am).” Her answer, from 
the point-of-view of monks, nuns and private property, is both interesting 
and unequivocal: she says, “I am the owner” (bdag dbang ngo). And this too 
is not problematic. The only problem is that the nun then threatens to take the 
man to court to collect on the debt—this, and this alone, is an offense against 
monastic rule, and even it is allowed, or at least involves no offense, if the 
nun is “one who earns with some difficulty” (tshegs chung ngus khugs pa— 
Derge, Ta 123a.5-124a.2).
The final example of a financial instrument we might note here is not 
formally contractual and requires a short excursus. Although the whole 
topic has received little attention, it appears that Buddhist monasteries in 
India and Buddhist monastic communities of the sort envisioned in the 
Mulasarvastivada-vinaya were ideally suited to provide care to the old and 
infirm, and to the sick and dying. There was, moreover, a distinct social need 
for such services, or at least the redactors of our Vinaya seem to have 
thought so. They seem to have thought that because of taboos concerning 
purity and pollution, brahmanical groups at least were not willing to provide 
services of this sort, even for their own. This much, it seems, can be deduced, 
for example, from texts like one that is found in the Sayanasanavastu 
(GMs&a. 13.24—.33). Here it is said that a young brahmin was staying in a 
hostel for young brahmins (manavakasala)}6 but he fell ill with vomiting 
and diarrhea. Rather than attend to him, however, the other brahmins, “from 
fear of pollution” (asucibhayad) threw him out and abandoned him. It was 
only the Buddhist monks Sariputra and Maudgalyayana who, when they 
chanced upon him, “cleaned him with a bamboo brush, rubbed him with
6 Raniero Gnoli prints manavakah salam, but the facsimile clearly has manavakasdlam 
(Raghu Vira and Lokesh Chandra, Gilgit Buddhist Manuscripts [Facsimile Edition. N ew  
Delhi. 1974]: vi. fo l. 948.2) and the Tibetan (Derge Ga 195a.3) bram ze  'i khye 'u zhig g i khyim 
du.
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white earth and bathed him.” Since they also “taught” the Dharma for him— 
and here this almost certainly can only refer to a kind of death-bed recita­
tion—he died in a good state of mind and was reborn in heaven. The 
function of Buddhist monks here is hard to miss—they, not one’s fellow 
brahmins, care for the sick and dying.
This story, however, concerns a chance encounter. Buddhist monasteries, 
on the other hand, at least those envisioned by the Mulasarvdstivdda-vinaya, 
were—unlike brahmanical hostels—ideologically, organizationally, and 
even architecturally suited to provide such services. Such monasteries 
would not only have had infirmaries, they also would have had the man­
power and organization to provide nurses and care to those who would oth­
erwise not have them. The Mulasarvdstivdda-vinaya, moreover, put a great 
deal of emphasis on just such services. We have already seen a rule that was 
designed to provide funding for such services for poor monks who could not 
themselves afford it, and this is not the only rule of this kind. Elsewhere 
(GMs iii 2, 128.1-131.15), when the Buddha himself finds another poor 
monk sick and “lying in his own urine and excrement,” he does exactly what 
Sariputra and Maudgalyayana had done for the young brahmin—with his 
own hands he cleans and bathes him. He then gives orders to the monks:
“Monks, apart from you, their fellow-monks, those who are 
sick have no mother, nor father nor other relative. As a conse­
quence, fellow-monks must attend to one another (tas mat sabrah- 
macdribhih parasparam upasthanam karaniyam)\ A preceptor 
(upddhydya) must do so for his co-residential pupil 
(sardhamviharin); a co-residential pupil for his preceptor; a 
teacher (acarya) for his disciple (antevasin); a disciple for his 
teacher [and so forth]. One who is bereft of an assembly and little 
known (alpa-jnata), to him the community must give an attendant 
monk after determining the state of his illness—one or two or 
many, even to the extent that the entire community must attend to 
him!”
This is a remarkable passage. If, for example, the roles of preceptor 
(upddhydya) and teacher (acarya) were ever conceived of primarily in terms 
of teaching functions, they certainly are not here. Here both roles are defined 
exclusively in terms of care-giving functions, and they are also so defined 
elsewhere in the Mulasarvdstivdda-vinaya. Entering into the relationship of 
“preceptor/co-residential-pupil” or “teacher/disciple” is known as “entering
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into dependence” (gnas bcas pa), and this is the one essential and indis­
pensable relationship that every Mulasarvastivadin monk must enter into. 
The Ksudrakavastu, for example, says that a monk can be without a recita­
tion teacher (klog pa  7 slob dpon) but not without a monk on whom he is 
dependent (Derge Tha 214a.6); in the same vastu monks are forbidden to 
travel without a monk in regard to whom they have entered into dependence; 
and numerous monasteries were said to have passed ordinances forbidding 
traveling monks who lacked such a supporting monk the right to accommo­
dations for even one night (Derge Tha 71b.7-72b.4). And it is repeatedly 
said, . the Blessed One has ordered entering into dependence for the sake 
of assisting one another, and for the purpose of attending to the sickness of 
those who are ill. . (bcom Idan ‘das kyis kyang.. gciggis gcig bstangzhing 
na ba 'i nad g-yog bya ba 7 phyir gnas bca ’ bar gnangs ba—Derge Tha 
213a.l), not, be it noted, for the purposes of instruction.
These rules make, of course, for a very attractive arrangement which if 
implemented would have provided for Mulasarvastivadin monks unparal­
leled security for long-term care. Embedded, as this arrangement would 
have been, in a “permanent” enduring institution, there would have been 
nothing like it in early medieval India. These monks would have been very 
well looked after in their final days, and this, in turn, may have been a pow­
erful motivating factor in an individual's decision to enter the order. It is at 
least notable that in the overwhelming majority of cases in our Vinaya in 
which a motive is given for an individual’s becoming a monk, that motive is 
connected with the fact that the individual concerned is either old or poor or 
without living relatives or sonless, and usually it is a combination of all four. 
Examples of this may be found throughout the Mulasarvastivdda-vinaya, in 
the Vibhanga (Derge Ca 90b.6; 61 a.4), in the Pravrajyavastu (Eimer ii 
193), in the Ksudraka (Derge Tha 100a.4; 114b.6; Da 138b.5), etc.
There are, of course, parallels for some of the arrangements and facilities 
at least envisioned by the redactors of the Mulasarvdstivada-vinaya. David 
Knowles, for example, has said in regard to medieval England that “in the 
fully developed monastery of the twelfth century facilities for care of the 
sick were probably greater than in any other place in the kingdom.”17 But in 
the English case—indeed in much of medieval European monasticism—we 
know that such “facilities” came to be an important part of monastic
17 David Knowles, The Monastic Order in England: A History o f  its Developmentfrom the 
Times o f  St. Dunstan to the Fourth Lateran Council 943-1216 (Cambridge: 1949): 477.
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economies and important sources of revenue by being made available, on a 
limited basis, not to the poor, but to the rich laity. By a series of arrange­
ments—none of which were very precisely defined—“confraternity,” “cor- 
rodies,” entry ‘W  succurrendum” the old, the sick, the almost certainly 
terminally ill were allowed the benefits of a monk and of the monastic facil­
ities while they were alive, with the expectation and sometimes formal 
promise that when they died, some, all, or a good share of their estates would 
go to the monastery.18 Although the bald “exchange” or “purchase” nature 
of these arrangements was often muted in the documents that recorded them, 
the effect was not, and both the basic arrangement and the verbal vagueness 
seem to have a parallel in the Mulasarvdstivdda-vinaya.
The parallel occurs again in the Civaravastu in a passage already referred 
to—the text that makes explicit reference to the use of a written will. It con­
cerns a very wealthy layman who, in spite of repeated attempts and repeated 
invocations of various gods, remains childless. As a consequence, the text 
says, he repudiated all the gods and came to have faith in the Blessed One 
(sarvadevatdh pratydkhyaya bhagavaty abhiprasannah—GMs iii 2, 
139.20), though the transition here is rather abrupt. He approaches a monk 
and asks for admission into the order. The initial motivating factor is here 
again the fact that the man is “sonless”; the implications are that he is also 
old and—as we shall see—he is about to become seriously ill. The monk 
shaves his head and begins to give him the rules of training (siksapada) but 
the rich man becomes ill, which creates an obstacle to his admission into the 
Order (pravrajyantarayakarena ca mahata jvarendbhibhutah). Here it is 
hard to miss the hand of the monastic lawyer: whoever wrote this little nar­
rative must have been fully aware of the fact that there were rules against 
admitting the sick into the Order and deftly avoided that difficulty by having 
the man’s illness become manifest only after the initial and most visible 
aspects of his admission—the shaving of his head—had occurred. The 
result, of course, was a thoroughly ambiguous situation from the point of 
view of monastic law which involved the status of the “shaven-headed 
householder”—visibly a monk—who had not been fully admitted into the 
Order. What obligations did the monastic community have in regard to such 
individuals? The monks, as was their usual practice in such ambiguous situ-
18 Knowles, The Monastic Order in England, 475fT; Joseph H. Lynch, Simoniacai Entry 
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ations, asked the Buddha—that is to say, our text would have been seen as 
providing a definitive solution. The Buddha rules that monastic care must be 
provided for the sick man (upasthanam asya karaniyam); he rules in other 
words that, in this regard at least, such an individual must be treated as a 
member of the community—Gunaprabha, incidentally, makes this interpre­
tation explicit.19 But the Buddha then specifically adds that such an individ­
ual must not be given the rules of training until he recovers (na tavac 
chiksapadani deyani yavat svasthah samvrttah—GMs iii 2, 140.5), and 
specifically rules that the monks themselves must attend to him. The 
Buddha's rulings in effect create a new category: a sick layman who has 
undergone the most visible act of admission to the Order, but who cannot, 
because of his illness, be fully admitted. The text goes on to indicate that the 
monks are obligated to attend to such individuals even if they are taken back 
to their own homes. This seems to clearly indicate that the redactor was fully 
conscious of the fact that he was inventing a new category. He says: “In 
regard to him [the sick householder] the designation ‘shaven-headed house­
holder’ arose” (tasya mundo grhapatir iti samjnd samvrtta— 140.13).
The obligations of the monks to “shaven-headed householders” were then 
made matters of explicit monastic rules, but what of the obligations of the 
“shaven-headed householders” to the monks: what did they owe them? As in 
the case of medieval European monasticism, the language used in regard to 
this question is careful, ambiguous, and avoids any direct reference to sale 
or purchase. We move from a language of rule and obligation to a situation 
of unexpressed—but probably nonetheless definite—expectation. We are 
simply told that when the “shaven-headed householder” knew he was on the 
point of death, he drew up a will leaving all of his enormous estate to the 
monastic community, and we are explicitly told that the state itself (i.e. the 
king) confirmed the monastic community’s rightful ownership of such an 
estate. The arrangement here was, then, not a formally contractual one; it 
was rather a matter of unstated but understood practice. A wealthy layman 
without heirs could undergo the initial and most visible aspects of the ritual 
of admission into the Mulasarvastivadin Order. As a result, the monks
19 For the passage in question we have a Sanskrit text for both the sutra and Gunaprabha’s 
auto*commentary: pravraiitavat atra Drdrabdha-tallihgah . . . .  yah  pravrajydrtham  
mundanadind vesamdtrena yojitah nddydpi pravrdjitah sa pravrajitavat drastavyah /. P. V. 
Bapat and V. V. Gokhale, Vinaya-Sutra (Patna: 1982): 46.19. A few lines later Gunaprabha 
actually uses the term mundagrhapati and Bu-ston ( ‘dul ba pha 'i gleng ‘bum chen mo ‘A 
55b.5) gives our Clvara text as Gunaprabha’s source.
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would be obliged to care for him, especially in his final days even if he 
remained at home. He in turn was expected, though not contractually obli­
gated, to leave his entire estate to the community, and the state formally 
acknowledged the legitimacy of such an arrangement.
It is also worth noting that the redactors of the Mulasarvdstivdda-vinaya 
seem to have anticipated that such an arrangement would or could have 
resulted in considerable amounts of cash or precious materials going direct­
ly to individual monks. Ibis, again, would seem to follow from the provi­
sions they put in place for dealing with specific forms of property or wealth 
that might form a part of such an estate. They stipulated, for example, that 
any mani gems, lapis lazuli or conch shells included in the estate must be 
divided into two lots, one for the Dharma, and one for the Community, and 
that, further, the Community’s share must then be divided among the monks 
(GMs iii 2, 143. 1). They stipulated that if the estate included any books or 
manuscripts containing non-Buddhist sastras (bahihsastrapustaka) those 
books must be sold (vikriya) and the profit, again, divided among the monks 
(GMs iii 2, 143.7). They stipulated too that any gold, money, or other pre­
cious metals, either worked or unworked (suvarnam ca hiranyam cdnyacca 
krtdkrtam) must be divided into three shares and the share for the 
Community must again be divided among the monks themselves.20 These 
provisions are completely in line, moreover, with a host of rules and prac­
tices throughout the Mulasarvdstivdda-vinaya. In the passage from the 
Ksudrakavastu dealing with monetary deposits made by donors with mer­
chants that has already been mentioned, the Buddha himself explicitly 
orders the monks to accept money (kdrsapanas) from the merchants (Derge 
Tha 258a.3-259a.3).21 In yet another passage from the Ksudrakavastu, the 
Buddha himself also orders monks not to divide certain kinds of expensive 
cloth that is given to them, but insists that the monks must first sell the cloth 
for money and then divide the money among themselves (de Ita bos na dge 
‘dun la gos kyi myed pa de Ita bu grub pa gang yin pa de kdr sha pa na dag 
tu bsgyur la /  kdr sha pa na dag bgo bar bya o—Derge Tha 263a.6). In the 
Civaravastu again monks are told that they must divide the profits among 
themselves after they have sold (vikriya) property that makes up part of the
2 0  In all three cases the wording is similar and explicit: yah samghasya sa bhiksubhir 
bhajayitavyah in the first and third case; bhiksubhir vikriya bhajayitavyah in the second.
21 In this case it is also made explicit that the money then belongs absolutely to 
the monks:. . . kar sha pa na dag blangs nas ci 'dod par yongs su spyad par bya ste I.
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estate of a deceased monk (GMs iii 2, 121.2; see also 119.14). In the 
Ksudraka, the Vibhahga, and the Uttaragrantha(s), finally, monks volunteer 
to act as “assistants for merit” (both the terms punya-sahdya and dharma- 
sahaya are used) on construction projects paid for by laymen and meant for 
the monks. In this role the monk receives the money (karsapanas)—usually 
a substantial amount—from the laymen, hires, oversees and pays the labor­
ers; buys the necessary tools; and is told, for example, to use the construc­
tion funds for his food, that is to say, to buy it (mkhar len byedpas mkhar len 
gyi nor kho na las bsod snyoms yongs su spyad par bya ’o—Derge Tha 
193b.7; see also Derge Ca 146a.2-148a.6; Pa 123a.7-124a.6; cf. GMs iii 4, 
139.9).
There are, of course, rules in the Mulasarvastivadin Pratimoksa which 
have been understood at least by modem scholars to forbid monks from 
engaging in almost all of these activities—handling “money,” buying and 
selling, etc. And here we have a particularly interesting problem. It is almost 
certainly not safe to assume that the Vinayadharas, the monastic lawyers, 
who compiled, shaped and probably wrote the Vinayavastus and the 
Vinayavibhahga were unfamiliar with their own Pratimoksa, especially 
since the Vibhahga is at least structurally based on it. But if the 
Vinayadharas knew their Pratimoksa, then there would seem to be at least 
two possible explanations for what we have seen here. It is possible that the 
Vinayadharas chose to ignore the Pratimoksa— and could so choose—that 
it was much less binding and authoritative than has been assumed. At the 
very least we may have to look much, much more carefully at the differences 
and divergencies between the Pratimoksas and the other expository parts of 
the Vinaya. Those differences may be much broader and more significant 
than even Schlingloff has said.22 Certainly the differences between the 
Mulasarvastivadin Bhiksunl-pratimoksa and Bhiksunl-vibhanga, for exam­
ple, are so great that Bu-ston at least thought that the Vibhahga was not 
Mulasarvastivadin at all.23 We may also have much to learn about the force 
and construction of monastic rules from medievalists working on western 
monastic codes. Louis Lekai, for example, in discussing early Cistercian
22 Dieter Schlingloff, “Zur Interpretation des Pratimoksasutra,” Zeitschrift der Deutschen 
Morgenldndischen Gesellschaft 113(1964): 536-51.
23 Claus Vogel, “Bu-ston on the Schism o f  the Buddhist Church and on the Doctrinal 
Tendencies o f  Buddhist Scriptures,” in Zur Schulzugehdrigkeit von Werken der Hinaydna- 
Literatur, Erster Teil, Hrsg. H. Bechert (Gottingen: 1985): 110; and Bu-ston, 'Dul ba dge 
slong ma 'i gleng ‘bum, (M a’i) ‘A 58b.5.
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monastic legislation has said, “The founders of Citeaux assumed a peculiar­
ly ambivalent attitude toward the Rule of Saint Benedict. They declared their 
utter devotion to it, but in fact they used that venerable document with 
remarkable liberality. They invoked and applied it when it suited their pur­
pose, ignored or even contradicted it when they thought that they had better 
ideas.”24 Even more helpful perhaps is what he says about the form of early 
Cistercian legislation:
24 Louis Julius Lekai, “ Ideals and Reality in Early Cistercian Life and Legislation,** in 
Cistercian Ideals and Reality (Cistercian Studies Series 60), ed. John R. Sommerfeldt 
(Kalamazoo: 1978): 4-29; esp. 5.
25 Lekai, “Ideals and Reality,” 17.
26 Schlingloff, “Zur Interpretation des Pratimoksasutra.” 538 n. 22: “Diese ‘Kasuistik* ist 
wohl der jungste Teil des Vibhanga”; O. von Hinuber, A Handbook o f  Pali Literature (Indian 
Philology and South Asian Studies 2. Berlin: 1996): 14.
27 Lekai, “Ideals and Reality,” 24.
A further proof of both the tentative nature of new regulations and 
the broad-minded, always compromising disposition of the chap­
ter fathers is the wording of virtually countless statutes before as 
well as after 1180. The beginning of such a paragraph is always a 
firm command or rigid prohibition, but the end lists the excep­
tions, often enfeebling the text to such an extent that it can hardly 
qualify for more than a fatherly advice.25
The last sentence in particular here could do good service as a description of 
the Pratimoksa rules as they occur in the Vibhanga: they almost all begin 
with a “firm command or rigid prohibition,” but end with a list of “excep­
tions” (anapatti) which—in the Buddhist case as well—can render them lit­
tle more than “fatherly advice.” An example of this sort of thing has already 
been cited above where the rule stated unequivocally that it is an offense if a 
nun goes to court to collect on a promissory note, but the exception, which 
immediately follows, says there is, however, no offense if the nun is “one 
who earns with difficulty.” In the Buddhist case it has been assumed or 
argued that these “exception” clauses represent a later chronological strata,26 
but this need not necessarily be the case. In the case of the Cistercian texts, 
it is in fact known that such exemption clauses were a part of the original 
legislation—they were there from the beginning—and their presence has 
been taken at least by Lekai as evidence for “a tolerant and flexible attitude” 
and, he says, should not be taken as “a sign of decay,” but as “evidence of 
health and vitality.”27 In fact we do not know for sure if in the early days the
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Pratimoksas were ever—apart from liturgical contexts—used without their 
Vibhahgas. It is at least hard to imagine that their rulings were ever actually 
applied without interpretation or discussion. But even if the andpattis—the 
exemptions, exclusions, extenuations—turn out to be later additions, that 
will make them not less, but even more important for tracking the develop­
ment and gradual maturation of Buddhist monastic rules.
A second possible explanation for what we have seen—although this is 
rarely the explanation of our first choice—is that Mulasarvastivadin 
Vinayad haras may have known their texts far better than we, and applied to 
them a far more sophisticated exegesis than we can. The Prdtimoksa rule 
that has been taken to forbid the “handling” of “money” by monks may be a 
case in point. We do not actually know what activity is forbidden. The verb 
in the Sanskrit text of the Mulasarvastivadin Prdtimoksa is udgrhniydd, but 
this has a very wide range of possible meanings, none of which are very 
close to “accept” or “have” (this would be rather pari or prati grab), and 
it has been translated in an equally wide range of ways.28 29 Worse still, we do 
not actually know what was intended or understood by Jataruparajata, the 
object of the action that was forbidden, that is conventionally translated by 
“gold and silver.” What, however, is clear to even us—and we must there­
fore assume was far clearer to Mulasarvastivadin monastic lawyers—is that 
the rule does not refer to suvarna, or hiranya or kdrsapanas (“gold”, “sil­
ver”, “money”) and it is these things that monks own, accept, handle and 
inherit in the Vibhariga, the Vinayavastus and the Uttaragrantha(s). This can 
hardly be an accident and must point again to the fact that Vinaya texts, like 
Abhidharma texts, represent a very sophisticated system of thought that 
works from a particular and precise definition of terms. It, again, can hardly 
be an accident that what is called the “old commentary” that is embedded in 
the Vibhahga is—as Norman says of the Pali Vinaya—  “really an analysis of 
words (pada-bhdjaniya).^ And conversely—even perversely—a part of
28 The same verb occurs in a closely related rule, Payantikd 59: yah punar bhiksu ratnam 
va [ratna]sammatam va svahastam udgrhniydd udgrahayed v a ... (Lokesh Chandra, “Un­
published Gilgit Fragment of the Prati moksa-sutra”, Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Siid- 
und Ostasiens 4 [I960] 8.6) and here can, it seems, only mean—and is almost always taken 
to mean—something like “pick up.” See also the discussion in the Bhaisajya-vastu dealing 
with jata-rupa-rajata where prati f g r a b  and ud -J~grab are explicitly and clearly distin­
guished: tasmat sramanerakenodgrahitavyam /  no tu pratigrahah svikartavyah /  GMs iii 1, 
248.6-16.
29 K. R. Norman, Pali Literature (A History of Indian Literature Vol. VII, fasc. 2. 
Wiesbaden: 1983): 19.
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this sophistication may in fact be an element of intentional ambiguity. Here 
too an observation of Lekai in regard to Cistercian texts may not be inap­
propriate: “In other cases the careful reader of the records may come under 
the impression that the wording of important statutes was made deliberately 
so vague or complicated that it left open a number of possible interpreta­
tions.”30 Unless I am much mistaken, this too will have numerous parallels 
in Buddhist Vinayas. In fact the Mulasarvastivadin rule which has been 
understood to mean that monks are forbidden to engage in “buying and sell­
ing” may be another case in point.31 It does not refer to unqualified “buying 
and selling”; nor does it refer—which it could easily have—to “all” (sarva) 
“buying and selling.” It refers to nana-prakdram kraya-vikrayam which, of 
course, could mean “buying and selling of various sorts” or “buying and 
selling of many sorts.” Neither interpretation precludes “all”, but neither 
requires it either. Mulasarvastivadin exegesis, moreover, clearly did not take 
it to have absolute application. The Vibhanga, for example, says that there is 
no fault in engaging in both unqualified buying and selling if  a monk is not 
seeking to gain (dge slong gis myedpa mi 'dodpas nyo bar byed cing rnyed 
pa mi ‘dodpas ‘tshong bar byed na gnyis ka la Itung ba med do—Derge Cha 
I56b.3).
30 Lekai, “ Ideals and Reality,”  22.
31 For the G ilg it text o f the rule see Banerjee, Two Buddhist Vinaya Texts in Sanskrit, 
29.20.
32 On Benedict’ s enormous influence on the study o f monasticism and the conception o f a 
monk, see Susanna Elm, Virgins o f  God: The Making o f  Asceticism in Late Antiquity 
(Oxford: 1994): v i i- v i i i ; l f f .
But what can be learned specifically about the Mulasarvastivdda-vinaya 
from our larger discussion? We now know that the Buddhist monks who 
wrote or redacted it in early medieval North India did not share our assump­
tions about Buddhist monks and the renunciation of private wealth or prop­
erty, and we—under the enormous influence of St. Benedict—think that this 
is an important element of any monastic ideal.32 Those same monks also 
apparently did not have the same attitude that we do in regard to monks’ 
involvement with money. They either knew monks who did, or wanted 
monks to do, all sorts of things that do not fit our assumptions: pay debts and 
tolls and transport taxable goods; own their own furniture and have the 
means to pay for any damage they might do to that of other monks; carry 
personal seals; pay for their own medicine and healing rituals; leave 
estates—sometimes huge; borrow money from laymen; inherit property
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both from other monks and laymen; accept and service permanent endow­
ments; make loans and charge interest; accept and use negotiable securities; 
provide care for sick and dying laymen with the understanding that when the 
layman died his estate would go to the monastery; receive precious and 
semi-precious materials, sell books, receive gold in various forms, accept 
money (karsapanas), sell the property of deceased monks, hire and oversee 
laborers and buy food. And this, of course, is only a provisional list of the 
sorts of things that Mulasarvastivadin monks were—in most cases—not 
only expected, but required to do by their own monastic rule. If they did not, 
then—at least in terms of monastic discipline—they would not be “good” 
monks. Exactly how many such “good” monks there were we obviously do 
not know, although it is at least certain that Indian monks accepted perma­
nent endowments and monetary deposits made with merchants; it is also cer­
tain that some Indian monks had personal seals?3 But whether all the things 
described in our Vinaya actually happened matters far less than the fact that 
Buddhist monks who were, presumably, the acknowledged authorities on 
monastic discipline spent a great deal of time thinking about them in North 
India in the early medieval period. These were—again presumably—monks 
who were in a position to influence actual communities, literate monks who 
were concerned with things other than asceticism, meditation and doctrinal 
study, monks who, again in their own terms, were the “good” monks. That 
they had a very different perspective than we do is confirmed by at least one 
further observation: unlike modem scholars, these “good” monks did not 
have very much good to say about monks who did engage in asceticism, 
meditation, and doctrinal learning. If they mention them at all—and they do 
so infrequently—it is almost always with a tone of marked ambivalence, if 
not actual ridicule. Ascetic monks, meditating monks, and learned monks 
appear in our Vinaya by and large only as slightly ridiculous characters in 
unedifying, sardonic and funny stories, or as nasty customers that “good” 
monks do not want to spend much time around?4
33 See for example—and this seems to be the earliest example so far— Richard Salomon, 
“Five Kharosthi Inscriptions,” Bulletin o f  the Asia Institute (Studies in Honor o f Vladimir A. 
Livshits) n.s. 10 (1996): 233-46; esp. 244-45 Salomon says, “These archaic features suggest 
an early date for this seal, possibly as early as the second century B. C.”
34 As a sampling o f  such texts, see GMs iii 1, 79.3-84.2; Derge Ja 154b.2-156b.7; Tha 
222b.2-224b. 1; GMs iii 4 ,71 .6ff; iii 1.56.2ff; Derge Da 35b.2-36a.2; Tha 39a.6-39b.5; GMs 
iii 1, 56.20-57.18; Derge Ja 79b.7-80b.3; Tha 180b. 1 - 181 a.4; 71b.7-72b.4; GMs iii 2, 
173.5-178.1; GMs iii 1,55.8-56.19; etc.
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The monks that the redactors of the Mulasarvastivada-vinaya envisioned, 
and the monks that modem scholarship has imagined, are then radically dif­
ferent, and this difference is extremely important for the historian of 
Buddhism in India. The monastic ideal found in the Mulasarvastivada- 
vinaya, for example, is almost certainly one of the most prominent monastic 
ideals that the authors of the Mahayana sutras encountered, and much of 
what these Mahayana authors said is probably only fully intelligible as a 
reaction against this ideal. If we are ever to understand more about the 
Mahayana we obviously are going to have to know, then, much, much more 
about what they were reacting to. This is our future task.
ABBREVIATIONS
In citing Sanskrit and Tibetan texts, the following abbreviations are used.
Derge: The Tibetan Tripitaka. Taipei Edition, ed. A. W. Barber (Taipei: 
1991). Cited according to original volume letter, folio number 
and lines.
GMS iii: Gilgit Manuscripts, ed. N. Dutt, vol. Ill, parts 1-4 (Srinagar/ 
Calcutta: 1942-50)
GMs$A: The Gilgit Manuscripts o f the Sayanasanavastu and the 
Adhikaranavastu, ed. Raniero Gnoli (Rome: 1978)
Shastri: Abhidharmakosa, ed. D. Shastri, Parts 1-4 (Varanasi: 1970-73)
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